Research

My work focuses on several topics related to the philosophy of logic, mathematics, and reasoning. Right now I am focused on a few projects: (i) a pragmatist epistemology of logic and its relation to anti-exceptionalism and logical pluralism, (ii) the value of games in reasoning (e.g. in transformative experience or as experiments in practical reasoning), and (iii) Aristotle’s views on mathematics, demonstration, and kinds by analogy. I have several papers related to (i) that have been recently published, I am presenting and drafting work related to (ii), and I am in the early stages of research on (iii). I have worked (and am happy to work in the future!) on research projects with undergraduates on related topics, so please reach out if you are interested in pursuing undergraduate research at UMaine.

Recent Work:
“Aristotle’s Arguments in Metaphysics Γ as Prudential Reasons for Non-Contradiction,” (accepted in Ancient Philosophy Today: DIALOGOI)
Abstract: One of the strongest challenges to Aristotle’s defense of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) in Metaphysics Γ comes from contemporary dialetheists, who accept some, but not all, contradictions. In this paper, I reconsider Aristotle’s refutations from the perspective of contemporary work in the epistemology of logic to argue that we can read them as providing prudential reasons for belief in PNC. This reading of the refutations reveals how they can provide reasons that not only are compelling for contemporary dialetheists but also would be missed by evidentialist positions in the epistemology of logic.

”Peirce on the Normative Basis of Deductive Logic,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 60:2, 2024, p.129-159. https://doi.org/10.2979/csp.00024

“Towards a Pragmatist Epistemology for Theory Choice in Logic,” Synthese, 204:9, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04654-4 (read only version accessible w/o subscription here)

”Competing Roles of Aristotle’s Account of the Infinite,” Apeiron, 57:1, 2024, p. 25-54. https://doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2023-0006

Dissertation: “Logic in Accounts of the Potential and Actual Infinite” (abstract).
Committee: Achille Varzi, Haim Gaifman (co-sponsors), Wolfgang Mann, John Morrison, Marko Malink.

Also, check out my Oxford Bibliographies piece on Greek and Roman Logic with Katja Vogt and Justin Vlasits: link here (univ. subscription req.).

Work in Progress:
I’ve recently been working on several papers that arose of a presentation at a workshop I organized in the Fall of 2024 at the University of Maine on Agency and Reasoning in Games. I’m happy to share drafts of the work if interested, although information may be removed as pieces go up for review.

“Suitsian Logical Games and Games as Logic”
Abstract: The study of logic and the study of games overlap naturally in many ways: logic’s historical roots in the practice of dialogue and argumentation, tied to competitive games of question and answer, and the study of games from the perspective of rational choice, tied to logical tools and formal systems, are both classic examples of that natural overlap. In this paper, I argue that work in this overlap, which has largely relied on a deflated formal analysis of ‘game’, should be expanded in two directions. Applying Suits’ analysis to the use of logic: (i) reveals a problem for his characterization of the lusory attitude and opens space for a variety of positions on rule-following in logic and games, and (ii) allows for fresh approaches to exploring the value of logic and problems of rule-following in the philosophy of logic.

“The Value Capture Argument for Logical Pluralism”
Abstract: In this paper, I bring together work in the philosophy of logic and the philosophy of games to analyze a previously unconsidered argument for logical pluralism. C. Thi Nguyen, in his book Games: Agency as Art, outlines cases of value capture as instances where our rich and subtle values of everyday life come to be replaced by simplified values in our reasoning and motivation via gamification or other metrics, which makes our lives worse. A classic case of value capture comes from fitness trackers like FitBit: our use of the tool for the sake of health can come to be replaced by a mere concern for high step counts, undermining our initial aims and making our lives worse. Appealing to some of my previous work on a pragmatism about logic inspired by Charles S. Peirce, I suggest that similar concerns can be raised about the use of deductive logic in evaluating our inferential practice. Several forms of a value capture argument for pluralism then arise: what I take to be an obvious and uninteresting version that suggests we ought to use more than just a theory of deductive validity in evaluating our inferential practice, and a more interesting version that suggests we ought to use more than one deductive theory in evaluating our inferential practice in order to avoid value capture. I consider this latter argument in detail, comparing it to related, well-known arguments for pluralism (e.g., the “virtue” argument of Beall and Restall) and extracting its background commitments (concerning the normativity of logic and its connection to epistemic values) in order to evaluate its strength and outline those who might find the argument compelling.

“The Value of Games in Reasoning about Transformative Experience“
Abstract: The orthodox view of rational choice suggests that one ought to choose an act that maximizes expected value. L.A. Paul in her book Transformative Experience (2014) raises a challenge for this orthodox view: some of our decisions are transformative. Relying on work by C. Thi Nguyen, I argue that games are uniquely suited to communicate aspects of agency that help us make rational choices in transformative decisions by allowing us to learn about ourselves prior to a transformative change. By examining a range of cases, I suggest one way of understanding that information is in terms of becoming aware of second-order desires via taking on some agency in gameplay, which allows for a variety of interactions with games: they could themselves be transformative, they could motivate us to pursue a transformative choice (irrationally), or even, I argue, serve as a “small step” in Ullmann-Margalit’s sense to help us rationally approach transformative decisions.