Research

My work focuses on several topics related to the philosophy of logic, mathematics, and reasoning. Right now I am focused on a few projects: (i) a pragmatist epistemology of logic and its relation to anti-exceptionalism and logical pluralism, (ii) the value of games in reasoning (e.g. in transformative experience or as experiments in practical reasoning), and (iii) Aristotle’s views on mathematics, demonstration, and kinds by analogy. I have several papers related to (i) that have been recently published, I am presenting and drafting work related to (ii), and I am in the early stages of research on (iii). I have worked (and am happy to work in the future!) on research projects with undergraduates on related topics, so please reach out if you are interested in pursuing undergraduate research at UMaine.

Recent Work:
”Use of Logic as a Suitsian Game” (accepted in Journal of the Philosophy of Sport)
Abstract: This paper lays the groundwork for expanding on past work on the connection between logic and games, which has largely focused on formal models of dialogical games or mathematical theories of games and decision. I lay out a new approach by arguing that use of formal, deductive logic can be fruitfully analysed as a Suitsian game. To do so, I outline an account of use of deductive logic in reasoning and motivate the analysis by appealing to Suits’ classic account of gameplay, his work on detective fiction, and a discussion of puzzle games. I then respond to worries that use of logic is not less efficient and that one does not take on a lusory attitude in using a logic. I suggest that in my responses one can see where the analysis bears fruit, both with respect to debates in the philosophy of games and in the philosophy of logic.

“Aristotle’s Arguments in Metaphysics Γ as Prudential Reasons for Non-Contradiction,” Ancient Philosophy Today: DIALOGOI, 7:2, 2025, p.202-223. https://doi.org/10.3366/anph.2025.0130)

”Peirce on the Normative Basis of Deductive Logic,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 60:2, 2024, p.129-159. https://doi.org/10.2979/csp.00024

“Towards a Pragmatist Epistemology for Theory Choice in Logic,” Synthese, 204:9, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04654-4 (read only version accessible w/o subscription here)

”Competing Roles of Aristotle’s Account of the Infinite,” Apeiron, 57:1, 2024, p. 25-54. https://doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2023-0006

Also, check out my Oxford Bibliographies piece on Greek and Roman Logic with Katja Vogt and Justin Vlasits: link here (univ. subscription req.).

Work in Progress:
I’ve recently been working on several papers that arose out of a presentation at a workshop I organized in the Fall of 2024 at the University of Maine on Agency and Reasoning in Games (the first of which is forthcoming and above). I’m happy to share drafts of the work if interested, although information may be removed as pieces go up for review.

“The Value Capture Argument for Logical Pluralism”
Abstract: In this paper, I bring together work in the philosophy of logic and the philosophy of games to analyze a previously unconsidered argument for logical pluralism. C. Thi Nguyen, in his book Games: Agency as Art, outlines cases of value capture as instances where our rich and subtle values of everyday life come to be replaced by simplified values in our reasoning and motivation via gamification or other metrics, which makes our lives worse. A classic case of value capture comes from fitness trackers like FitBit: our use of the tool for the sake of health can come to be replaced by a mere concern for high step counts, undermining our initial aims and making our lives worse. Appealing to some of my previous work on a pragmatism about logic inspired by Charles S. Peirce, I suggest that similar concerns can be raised about the use of deductive logic in evaluating our inferential practice. Several forms of a value capture argument for pluralism then arise: what I take to be an obvious and uninteresting version that suggests we ought to use more than just a theory of deductive validity in evaluating our inferential practice, and a more interesting version that suggests we ought to use more than one deductive theory in evaluating our inferential practice in order to avoid value capture. I consider this latter argument in detail, comparing it to related, well-known arguments for pluralism (e.g., the “virtue” argument of Beall and Restall) and extracting its background commitments (concerning the normativity of logic and its connection to epistemic values) in order to evaluate its strength and outline those who might find the argument compelling.

“The Value of Games in Reasoning about Transformative Experience“
Abstract: The orthodox view of rational choice suggests that one ought to choose an act that maximizes expected value. L.A. Paul in her book Transformative Experience (2014) raises a challenge for this orthodox view: some of our decisions are transformative. Relying on work by C. Thi Nguyen, I argue that games are uniquely suited to communicate aspects of agency that help us make rational choices in transformative decisions by allowing us to learn about ourselves prior to a transformative change. By examining a range of cases, I suggest one way of understanding that information is in terms of becoming aware of second-order desires via taking on some agency in gameplay, which allows for a variety of interactions with games: they could themselves be transformative, they could motivate us to pursue a transformative choice (irrationally), or even, I argue, serve as a “small step” in Ullmann-Margalit’s sense to help us rationally approach transformative decisions.